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A ‘panoptical’ or ‘synoptical’ approach to monitoring performance? 
Local public services in England and the widening accountability 
gap 
 
Abstract 
 
This article highlights how recent reforms to the auditing and assessment of local 
public services in England suggest there will be a shift from panoptical to 
‘synoptical’ monitoring approaches. This is because the UK Government has 
abolished its centralised monitoring regime and instead required local authorities 
to publish a range of financial and performance datasets online, ostensibly so that 
citizens can hold organisations to account directly. However, the complexity and 
raw nature of these data, along with the sidelining of professional auditors, will 
result in most citizens being either unable or unwilling to undertake this task. As 
such, the proposed ‘synoptical’ approach will not materialise. Indeed, other 
legislative changes will mean that outsourcing firms effectively become the new, 
unaccountable observers of local public sector bodies within an enduring 
panoptical system. In many cases these companies will then assume 
responsibility for delivering the same services that they have assessed.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In a previous issue of this journal, Vaughan Radcliffe posited that public auditors 
often collude in ‘public secrets’ by withholding from their reports the real reasons 
why organisations may not have achieved optimal outcomes (Radcliffe, 2008). 
Radcliffe’s view was countered by Funnell (2010), who held that auditors should 
not comment on matters of policy and instead restrict their enquiries to 
operational issues. Radcliffe responded to Funnell by highlighting that public 
auditors in the USA are often directly elected and are therefore explicitly political 
actors. In contrast, in most Commonwealth countries they are appointed and 
therefore potentially more independent (Radcliffe, 2011).  
 
This article does not take sides in the debate between Radcliffe and Funnell. 
Instead, it highlights how their debate will be transcended by the emergence of a 
new approach to performance auditing in England, which raises significant 
concerns for the accountability of local public services1. Using the surveillance 
metaphor that was developed by Jeremy Bentham and popularised by Foucault 
(1977), it illustrates how the UK’s Coalition Government has claimed that 
decisions such as the abolition of the Audit Commission mean that it is moving 
away from a ‘top-down’, panoptical approach to monitoring the performance of 
English local authorities.  
 
Following this line of argument, policy initiatives such as the ‘transparency’ 
agenda (which requires public bodies to make financial and performance data 
available online) should herald a shift towards what Mathiesen (1997) termed a 
‘post-panoptical’ or ‘synoptical’ model of surveillance. For Mathiesen, modern 
technologies and the mass media have led to the development of a ‘synoptical’ 
situation in Western societies, because they allow the wider public to watch and 
monitor the behaviour of the powerful few, who are then encouraged to moderate 
their activities to prevent citizens from identifying misconduct. In this way, it is 
the polar opposite of Bentham’s Panopticon, which encouraged the masses to act 
‘normally’ in the knowledge that someone in power may be observing them. 
 
However, the sheer volume and nature of the data that public bodies are being 
asked to publish, together with the impact of other policy initiatives that aim to 
encourage other providers to deliver public services on behalf of the state, mean 
that this new model will be nothing but a mirage. As this article will demonstrate, 
we are more likely to see private sector companies become the observers (the de 
facto performance auditors of local authorities) within an enduring panoptical 
system, as publicly-funded watchdogs such as the Audit Commission are sidelined 
and/or abolished. These developments run counter to the Government’s claims 
that its new approach will enhance the democratic oversight of public services, 
and exacerbate the existing accountability concerns of various New Public 
Management scholars. They will also result in the debate between Radcliffe and 
Funnell on auditor independence and upholding ‘public secrets’ taking off in an 
entirely new direction. 
 
As the context used is very current, this paper employs an explanatory study 
methodology (Scapens, 1990) to set out how a new model of surveillance is likely 
to develop. It examines government publications such as the Open Public 
Services white paper (Cabinet Office, 2011) and Localism Act (HM Government, 
2011), as well as ministerial announcements, to identify policy objectives and 
how these initiatives are likely to influence the delivery of public services. In 
addition, it also reviews the extant literature on panoptical control approaches, 
                                           
1 The article concentrates on those services for which English local authorities are responsible. The 
nature of panoptical performance monitoring systems in other parts of the public sector, such as 
health and central government, remain largely unchanged. 
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auditing and accountability, and New Public Management to inform a discussion 
around how these policy initiatives will shape the future scenario.  
 
The remainder of this paper discusses the following in turn: theories of visibility, 
Panopticism and Synopticism; the role of the public auditor; New Public 
Management; the Open Public Services white paper; the requirements and 
potential impact of the UK Government’s ‘transparency’ agenda; and how the 
‘right to challenge’ will provide a bottom-up lever to transform local public 
services2. These disparate strands are then brought together in the discussion 
and conclusion to show how the surveillance model for local public services in 
England is set to develop, and its implications for accountability.  
 
 
3. Background 
 
3.1 Visibility, Panopticism and Synopticism 
 
The idea of a Panopticon, a disciplinary system that incorporates an agent who 
can observe others without them knowing that they are being watched, was first 
publicised by Jeremy Bentham in the late eighteenth century (Bentham, 1995). 
Bentham argued that prisons and other institutions should be designed so that 
people in these buildings could be observed at any time, but not be able to see 
the watcher themselves. He held that if people knew they might be under 
surveillance, they would discipline themselves and conform to societal and 
behavioural norms – regardless of whether someone was watching them or not. 
As such, they could be controlled without using excessive force. Although no 
prison was ever built that conforms exactly to Bentham’s design, Michel Foucault 
embraced the concept of the Panopticon as a metaphor for discipline and control 
in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977).  
 
Foucault’s arguments heralded a new interest in the analogy, which has continued 
until the present day. In particular, the increasing prevalence of data-capturing 
technologies such as closed-circuit television, smart cards and the internet has 
increased the popularity of the Panopticon as a way of describing contemporary 
life in developed countries. According to this line of argument, modern 
technologies can monitor the behaviour of individuals and make it visible. Since 
people are aware that their activities may be monitored, they will not wish to be 
singled out as being somehow abnormal and therefore choose to act responsibly.  
 
In addition, the metaphor of constant surveillance can be extended to 
organisations as well as individuals. For example, managers can record and 
measure the activities of their staff, business units and organisations, ostensibly 
to inform decision-making and improve performance (Covaleski et al., 1998; 
Brivot and Gendron, 2011). These concepts have proven particularly popular in 
accounting literature, because of the way in which quantification can make 
people, business units and organisations comparable (Mennicken and Miller, 
2012). Moreover, in recent decades Western governments have established 
watchdogs and extensive monitoring frameworks specifically to oversee the 
activities of publicly-funded bodies. Several scholars have compared these 
systems to the Panopticon, arguing for example that they monitor public bodies 
to try and ensure ‘corruption-free government’ (Anechiario and Jacobs, 1994), or 
to improve financial management and performance (Perryman, 2006). 
                                           
2 Responsibility for local government lies with the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. As a result, the Localism Act and transparency requirements, as well as most of the 
Open Public Services white paper, only apply to authorities in England, despite emanating from the UK 
Government. Therefore this article refers to the UK-wide Government as the source of policy 
initiatives, but to England as the area in which they take effect. 
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However, others have pointed out that the panoptical metaphor is too simplistic 
to describe Western societies (see Boyne (2000) for a list of five theoretical 
arguments in favour of abandoning the concept). In particular, Thomas Mathiesen 
(1997) turned the concept of the Panopticon on its head. He posited that we are 
moving towards a post-panoptical, or synoptical, society; that is, Western 
civilisation is increasingly characterised by lots of people being able to observe 
the lives of a select few, rather than the other way around.  
 
To illustrate this, in the era of smartphones, microphones, mass media and the 
internet, public officials and those standing for election should be aware that their 
every move could be monitored and publicised. For example, during the 2010 
election campaign, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown remarked that a member 
of the public with whom he had spoken was ‘bigoted’. Unbeknown to him, this 
comment was caught by a microphone and subsequently replayed to him during a 
radio interview. Other examples, such as citizens filming the actions of police 
officers during political demonstrations, also show how the “machinery of 
surveillance is now always potentially in the service of the crowd as much as the 
executive” (Boyne, 2000, p. 301).  
 
We shall see later how the UK Government has claimed that this non-hierarchical 
synoptical model will replace the previous panoptical approach to public service 
monitoring and assessment (Cabinet Office, 2011). Ministers have argued – albeit 
implicitly – that a synoptical process is more democratic, and also more effective 
at improving public services than the previous centralised regime. In spite of this 
rhetoric however, the complexity of public data combined with other legislative 
changes will mean that this situation will not materialise. Instead, the panoptical 
system will continue, but private companies will replace publicly-funded 
watchdogs as observers. This will raise significant concerns about the 
accountability of public services, as well as how they are audited and assessed. 
 
3.2 The role of the auditor 
 
Traditionally, auditors are responsible for assessing standards of financial 
management and performance in public bodies, which helps the state to discipline 
its agencies and achieve political objectives. Audit recommendation is a reflection 
of the independent judgments of what went wrong and how to rectify them and, 
if we understand it as a socially constructed practice, public auditing is a 
technology that could offer more potential in governing economic and social life 
than we often associate with its function (Radcliffe, 1999).  
 
However, within this context we need to recognise that auditors’ 
recommendations can be influenced by how they think their client will respond to 
suggestions. For example, recent issues of this journal have featured a debate 
between Vaughan Radcliffe and Warwick Funnell about the extent to which public 
auditors should (or are permitted to) comment on the wide range of factors that 
may have contributed towards particular outcomes. Radcliffe (2008) highlighted a 
state auditor’s report into public schools in Cleveland, which presented an 
incomplete picture of the reasons why children attending schools in the centre of 
the city achieved poor exam results. He argued that the state auditor deliberately 
avoided discussing the impact of social deprivation on school achievement, 
because he knew that the Ohio legislature would not act on this issue. Instead, 
the auditor modified his findings to focus solely on those issues that would be 
more ‘acceptable’ to politicians in order to maximise his potential influence. As a 
result, the report focused on management issues and completely ignored the 
socioeconomic reasons why children in the centre of Cleveland did not achieve 
high exam grades. As such, “[t]he auditors’ approach can at once be seen as 
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pragmatic, in aiming to affect whatever change or improvement is possible, and 
limiting, in that they are constrained both by themselves and others from making 
observations that may be publicly unpalatable” (Radcliffe, 2008, p. 99).  
 
Drawing on Taussig (1999), Radcliffe argued that auditors are thus implicated in 
a public secret – something that “is generally known but cannot be articulated or 
spoken” (Taussig, 1999, p. 5) and therefore cannot present a full interpretation of 
the facts. Taussig developed this concept after several years in Colombia, where 
local people were fully aware of the extent to which state employees colluded 
with drug-running guerrillas, but they knew that the issue could not be mentioned 
in public. Although the notion has roots in an extreme example, Taussig argued 
that public secrets are essential for the smooth running of all societies, not just 
those characterised by lawlessness and armed guerrillas. To illustrate this, he 
cites Foucault’s (1980) observation that sex is considered taboo in developed 
countries and, in Radcliffe’s words, “knowing what not to know becomes a skill 
that is learned, shared and is in certain ways functional” (Radcliffe, 2008, p. 
104).  
 
Radcliffe does not address explicitly the implications of public secrecy in auditing 
for democratic accountability. However, assuming that these secrets are indeed 
widely-known, there would be no need for the Ohio state auditor to highlight the 
‘real’ reasons why schoolchildren in Cleveland do not attain high exam grades: 
everybody would already be aware of them. Instead, by fulfilling the initial aims 
of the audit (restricting its scope to managerial issues), and therefore his own 
construction of how he should be held accountable (Sinclair, 1991), the state 
auditor has performed his role by holding the government to account on behalf of 
the public.  
 
Regular readers of this journal will be familiar with the riposte from Funnell 
(2011), who argued passionately in support of auditors’ professional 
independence, and against the idea that their judgments may be influenced by 
the political environment. At the core of Funnell’s argument was the point that 
auditors do not comment on matters of policy: their constitutional role is to 
assess and make judgments on operational issues. To place this in the 
Foucauldian context, Funnell’s implicit argument is that auditors should observe 
operational and managerial issues very closely, but they must not comment on 
the wider political environment. As such, they should act as observers in the 
panoptical system, but – paradoxically – only within a limited arena. Indeed, it is 
often beyond their constitutional remit to reveal ‘public secrets’ or point out that 
the emperor has no clothes.  
 
Radcliffe (2011) responded by re-iterating that many state auditors in the US are 
directly elected – rather than appointed, as is the case in the UK and many 
Commonwealth countries. Indeed, as was the case for Cleveland’s state auditor, 
they often have higher political ambitions and their judgments are therefore likely 
to be compromised by the wider political context. As such, Radcliffe did not 
dispute that auditors should consider managerial issues when analysing the 
outcomes of public policy. Instead, he argued that their inherently political nature 
compromised their independence and meant that they could not consider the 
whole range of potential factors when making a judgment.  
 
Despite their differences, it is important to note that Funnell and Radcliffe agree 
that performance auditing is an essential function in a democratic state. They 
both believe that it should provide the public with an independent assessment of 
whether policies are having their desired effect. They only disagree over the 
range of factors that auditors should consider when making a judgement about 
 6 
policy effectiveness, and whether the wider political environment could 
compromise their independence. 
 
3.3 New Public Management and its implications for audit and 
accountability 
 
Over recent decades, public auditors have focused an increasing amount of their 
work on managerial reforms in public bodies. These reforms, which are grouped 
under the general heading of New Public Management (NPM), are primarily aimed 
at cutting costs and doing ‘more for less’ through better management, 
transparency, user choice, contestability and greater involvement of the private 
sector in delivering public goods and services (Hood, 1991, 1995). For several 
decades now, various UK Government initiatives have sought to use NPM 
principles to shape public sector practices. Indeed, NPM has evolved from being a 
set of ideas about how public services should be managed and delivered to 
become a practical reality in most Western countries. These principles were the 
basis of public sector reforms such as privatisation, public private partnerships 
and the private finance initiative, all of which were undertaken in the name of 
greater efficiency, value for money and accountability (Broadbent and Guthrie, 
2008; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; Hood 1991, 1995; Letza and Smallman, 
2001; Ogden, 1995; Shaoul, 1997). 
 
While the extant literature is supportive of the public sector’s efforts to promote 
value for money, efficiency and improve accountability practices (Broadbent and 
Guthrie, 1992), it is less conclusive as to whether they have actually been 
successful (Broadbent et al., 2003; Lapsley, 1999, 2009; Mayston, 1999; Shaoul, 
1997). In other words, critics of NPM do not dispute that the reforms have taken 
place, or that they had worthwhile objectives. Instead, they focus on issues such 
as the extent to which they have improved policy delivery (see for example 
Rhodes 1997), their inherent contradictions (Talbot 2003; Rathgeb-Smith 2003) 
or the complexity and problematic nature of entering into long term contracts 
with suppliers (Broadbent et al., 2003; Demirag and Khadaroo, 2008; English and 
Baxter, 2010; Froud, 2003).  
 
As such, we can conclude that one of the important challenges of NPM is to 
balance improving public sector efficiency with protecting the interests of the 
public. Up to now, this role has largely been played by public sector auditors, 
whose audit reports and recommendations act as technologies to allow them to 
manoeuvre between the ‘moderniser’ and the independent appraiser of the 
efficiency of public sector practices (Skaerbaek, 2009). This dual role has been 
discussed extensively in academic literature, and scholars agree that it is 
important for auditors to give independent assurance that the interests of the 
public are being protected (Free and Radcliffe, 2009; Gendron et al., 2001; 
Gendron et al., 2007), and to highlight the potential implications for democratic 
accountability (Pollitt, 1986).  
 
However, a key issue here is that, where public services are outsourced, their 
delivery is shaped by the interests of both the government and the private or 
third sector service provider (Schuppert, 2006; Giddens, 2009). Although the 
supplier may represent the interest of the general public in terms of achieving 
value for money, transparent information, improved efficiency and 
competitiveness, it is less clear whether the interests of the government and the 
general public are carried through in practice (Hood, 1991, 1995). This is 
particularly the case where governments have sought to keep their dealings with 
outsourcing companies secret on the grounds of commercial confidence (Funnell, 
2000). In these situations we can never be certain whether the service provider 
(or indeed the government) is acting in the public interest – and therefore the 
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public cannot hold them to account. This has led numerous academics to argue 
that contracting private companies to deliver public services reduces democratic 
accountability (see for example Pollitt, 1986; Funnell, 2000; Letza and Smallman, 
2001; Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003). 
 
In spite of these reservations, and partly because it perceived public sector 
reform through budgeting and governing to be necessary to deal with financial 
austerity (Ferry and Eckersley, 2011, 2012), the UK’s Coalition Government of 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats has continued with the NPM agenda since 
taking office in May 2010. The remainder of this section will focus on three 
initiatives that are based on New Public Management principles: the ‘Open Public 
Services’ white paper, the ‘transparency’ agenda, and the ‘right to challenge’ local 
public service providers. Taken together, these three initiatives will not only 
accelerate the trend towards outsourcing the delivery of public services, but they 
will also result in private companies replacing publicly-funded watchdogs as the 
chief observers within the panoptical system of performance assessment. The 
relevant points from each agenda are set out below. 
 
3.3.1 The Open Public Services white paper 
 
The Open Public Services white paper developed from a consultation that was 
launched in late 2010, and an article by Prime Minister David Cameron that 
featured in the Daily Telegraph in February 2011. In the article Mr Cameron 
promised to “break open public sector monopolies” by introducing a new 
presumption that all public services would be opened up to competition, apart 
from the judiciary and security services (Cameron, 2011). The Government 
produced an additional document, entitled “Open Public Services 2012”, in March 
2012 (Cabinet Office, 2012), which re-iterated the principles and objectives from 
the earlier paper.  
 
The main thrust of the white paper sets out the Government’s vision for a more 
diverse market in public services, with a greater role for third sector organisations 
and private companies in delivery. As such, it echoes much of the NPM rhetoric of 
various UK politicians from recent decades, particularly since the introduction of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering in local government. However, in a new twist, 
the white paper articulates the Government’s view that it cannot (and indeed 
should not) reform and improve public services directly from Whitehall by pulling 
particular bureaucratic levers or introducing new regulations and duties. To return 
to Bentham’s model therefore, it rejects the idea that performance assessment 
and improvement should rely on a centralised panoptical approach. Instead, it 
says that ministers should set out the conditions that allow services to be 
improved from the ‘bottom-up’ through market mechanisms, increased 
transparency and local accountability (Cabinet Office, 2011). As such, the 
Government is proposing that a synoptical model, which gives the public direct 
access to more information about local authority performance and financial 
management, would ensure that service providers operate more effectively. 
 
The white paper sets out a framework, based on five principles for reform, in 
which these bottom-up activities should operate. This subsection addresses the 
implications of two of these principles: the view that public services should be 
‘opened up’ to be delivered by a range of providers, and the argument that they 
should be made more accountable and responsive. It focuses in particular on 
those services that the white paper describes as ‘commissioned’: that is, where 
purchasers can be separated from providers and therefore be subjected to 
competitive tendering and payment-by-results mechanisms. This is a key 
objective of the Government: as the white paper states, “the principles of open 
public services will switch the default from one where the state provides the 
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service itself to one where the state commissions the service from a range of 
diverse providers” (Cabinet Office, 2011, p. 29).  
 
UK Governments use white papers to set out policy strategy; in most cases the 
ideas that they espouse need to appear in subsequent legislation. As such, this 
white paper is short on the details of how Open Public Services can be translated 
in terms of detailed policy and legislative proposals. However, closer examination 
of the ‘right to challenge’ incumbent service providers that features in the 2011 
Localism Act, as well as the ‘transparency’ agenda, suggests that additional 
legislation would not be necessary – at least to trigger change at the local level. 
As a result, these initiatives, which are covered in more detail in the next 
subsections, are likely to herald a significant increase in the outsourcing of public 
services over the coming years.  
 
The white paper argues that ‘opening up’ public services so that alternative 
providers can deliver them will increase accountability, because customers would 
be able to respond to providers through ‘choice and voice’ mechanisms (Cabinet 
Office, 2011), and market dynamics would ultimately mean poor performers no 
longer deliver services. It sets out how these mechanisms would enable 
individuals to either opt for an alternative provider or complain to elected officials 
or the Ombudsman if performance is poor.  
 
However, in most cases individuals will only be able to access services from a 
single provider, and elected officials will also be relatively powerless to respond to 
poor performance during the period of a contract. Indeed, as outlined above, 
outsourcing and privatisation has been criticised for reducing accountability, 
because it means that elected bodies are no longer directly responsible for public 
services and they may not be able to make major changes to service provision 
within the constraints of an outsourcing contract (Broadbent et al., 2003, 
Broadbent and Laughlin, 2003; English and Baxter, 2010). As Funnell (2000) 
highlights, the result is often that citizens receive poorer public services, yet are 
powerless to respond through elected representatives.  
 
In short therefore, NPM ideas have reduced the accountability of public services, 
because many of these services are no longer delivered by democratically-elected 
bodies. Therefore, since implementing the white paper’s proposals will almost 
certainly result in a new wave of outsourcing, public services will become even 
less accountable than is currently the case. More importantly however, this 
increase in the outsourcing of public service delivery is likely to occur alongside 
what amounts to the outsourcing of public service auditing and assessment, 
which would widen the accountability gap further and raise new questions about 
the role of the private sector in public services. 
 
3.3.2 The ‘transparency’ agenda 
 
The second key agenda to consider is the Government’s programme to replace 
formal performance assessments with data ‘transparency’. Since taking office the 
UK’s Coalition Government has introduced a range of reforms to performance 
management and auditing that will have significant implications for local 
authorities in England. Most notably, it announced the closure of the Audit 
Commission - a non-departmental public body that carried out performance 
assessments of local authorities alongside its audit practice. Although the 
Commission’s role in overseeing local authority financial auditing has been passed 
to the National Audit Office (a body that also monitors central government 
spending), no public body has taken over responsibility for monitoring the 
performance of local public services. As a result, frameworks such as 
Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA), which judged how well public bodies in 
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England were delivering a set of agreed policy outcomes in the local area, are no 
longer in force. The predecessor to CAA, Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment, judged local authorities more explicitly on service performance, 
assessed how well they used resources, and gave each council a ‘star’ rating. In 
this way, both frameworks ensured that citizens, public officials and elected 
representatives were given an independent report into how well their authority 
was performing, which was based on a range of relevant data and sources. This 
centralised monitoring system, which had the Audit Commission at its heart, can 
be compared to that of the Panopticon, because local authorities were constantly 
aware that they may be under surveillance and behaved accordingly. Following 
the abolition of this architecture of auditing and assessment, it would appear that 
local authorities are no longer being monitored by an all-seeing observer. As 
such, they might be less likely to conform to expected norms of behaviour and 
could allow standards of financial and performance management to fall.  
 
To fill the vacuum, the Government announced that local public bodies in England 
would have to publish a range of datasets and spending information online 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010), including data on 
the costs and performance of their services and details of senior officers’ salaries 
and expenses. This built on previous initiatives to ‘open up’ the workings of 
government, such as the Freedom of Information Act. Ministers argued that 
publishing these data would allow individual citizens to act as ‘armchair auditors’ 
and that they – rather than the professionals in the Audit Commission – would be 
able to hold public bodies to account for their spending decisions. In this way, the 
Government argued (albeit implicitly) that a non-hierarchical synoptical approach 
would be a more democratic way of monitoring local public service bodies than 
the centralised panoptical model. This is because data transparency ensures that 
public auditors are unable to maintain ‘public secrets’ with their clients. Indeed, 
professional auditors will become increasingly irrelevant under this new regime, 
because members of the public will assume some of their responsibilities for 
assessing public services.  
 
However, the ‘Siamese twins’ of transparency and accountability can exist 
separately from one another (Hood, 2010). In this case, although the reforms 
have been accompanied by democratic rhetoric, it is questionable whether the 
published data are in fact meaningful to the public, and therefore whether the 
Synopticon analogy actually applies. In response to the Government’s initial drive 
for transparency, some authorities argued that raw spending data should not be 
published purely for its own sake (Nottingham City Council, 2011). Echoing 
O’Neill (2006), these critics argued that armchair auditors require significant 
resources and additional contextual information about how local public services 
are delivered in order to give them an indication of how specific lines of spending 
may have contributed towards outcomes. After all, their professional counterparts 
base their judgments on far more than just the organisation’s balance sheet: they 
interpret a range of information for the benefit of elected representatives and – 
ultimately – citizens. Following Foucault (1977), auditors aim to ensure that data 
that would otherwise be ‘invisible’ (because they cannot be accessed or analysed 
easily by stakeholders) become ‘visible’ when they enter the public domain 
through audit judgments and assessments.  
 
Since professional public audit has been sidelined however, neither the public nor 
elected representatives will receive these independent assessments about 
supplier performance. As a result, citizens will not necessarily be able to make an 
informed judgment about a service provider and hold them to account. Therefore, 
although ministers may argue that moving towards a synoptical model will 
improve accountability, it is doubtful whether members of the public will be able 
to access enough relevant and accessible data to make an informed assessment 
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of performance. In other words, despite being publicly available, the data will 
remain ‘invisible’ and the Synopticon will only exist at the level of ministerial 
rhetoric.  
 
As an additional point, performance audit is not just a ‘policing’ function: it also 
aims to suggest ways to improve in practice. ‘Armchair auditors’ are very unlikely 
to have enough knowledge about how a service is managed and delivered to 
make these recommendations, and therefore will be unable to assume the 
traditional role of a ‘critical friend’ who can suggest improvements following an 
assessment.  
 
3.3.3 The Localism Act and the ‘right to challenge’ 
 
It is at this juncture where the third piece in the puzzle – the ‘right to challenge’ 
that features in the 2011 Localism Act (HM Government, 2011) – completes the 
picture. This new right, which like the transparency requirement only applies in 
England, was ostensibly introduced to allow voluntary and community 
organisations, social enterprises and council employee groups (or ‘mutuals’) to 
express an interest in running any service for which the local authority is 
currently responsible. If one of these groups submits a challenge, the authority is 
required to consider the proposals and accept or reject them depending on 
whether the challenger can show that it would deliver the service cheaper or 
better than the incumbent provider. In keeping with the principles of the white 
paper therefore, it is likely to mean that more local public services are outsourced 
to alternative providers. 
 
The new framework takes the principles of Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
(CCT) to a new level. CCT was introduced in the 1980s and remained in place 
until the late 1990s. It required local authorities to assess whether their services 
could be delivered more cheaply by private providers and, if this proved to be the 
case, they had to be put out to tender. Staff in the authority had to calculate the 
existing costs of the service through a complex formula (T-Quantum), in order to 
identify whether alternative suppliers could deliver it for less.  
 
A key part of this arrangement was that local authorities had a statutory 
responsibility for calculating T-Quantum in prescribed percentages. This 
assessment was undertaken by council finance departments. By incorporating 
accounting arrangements such as central administration recharging into the 
design of this efficiency assessment, these departments retained significant 
control over any decision to outsource. In keeping with Radcliffe (1999), these 
audits became self-constructed and their findings were quite predictable: many 
‘blue-collar’ services (such as waste collection, street cleansing and housing 
maintenance) were exposed to competition and ultimately outsourced. In 
contrast, most ‘white-collar’ services remained in-house, including the finance 
departments that were responsible for calculating T-Quantum in the first place. 
Independent auditors were not involved in this part of the process; they only 
judged some of the tendering arrangements at a later stage, in order to assess 
value for money and to ensure compliance with accounting procedures under the 
UK’s Statement of Recommended Practice (SORP). 
 
In contrast, the Open Public Services white paper takes this discretion away from 
public managers by inviting external suppliers to challenge incumbent providers 
and trigger a procurement process. Although the local elected Council will be able 
to accept or reject any challenge, it may wish to avoid potential legal disputes by 
ensuring that any decision to keep a service in-house is supported by some 
evidence. This evidence would almost certainly include any transparency data 
that suggest an alternative supplier would not be able to improve the service or 
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deliver it at lower cost. Furthermore, elected representatives are probably more 
inclined to approve any outsourcing challenges than the finance directors who 
would be more directly affected by them.  
 
The right to challenge was initially heralded as a way of helping to deliver the 
Government’s aim of a ‘Big Society’, in which voluntary organisations assume 
greater responsibility for public services such as parks, sports centres or 
community buildings. Indeed, the Localism Act more generally was originally 
viewed as a key mechanism for implementing many of these Big Society 
principles. In this way, the right to challenge can be seen as complementing other 
initiatives that have been aimed at reforming public services from the ‘bottom-
up’. Indeed, the legislation stipulates that it can be exercised by voluntary and 
community bodies, charitable trusts, parish councils or authority employees – in 
addition to any “other person or body as may be specified by the Secretary of 
State by regulations” (HM Government 2011, 100).  
 
However, under European procurement law, the purchasing authority must 
maintain a neutral stance when considering bids for public contracts. As such, it 
will be difficult to restrict this right to third sector organisations, meaning that 
large outsourcing companies could also be able to exercise it, and challenge 
incumbent providers (Trades Union Congress, 2011). These larger suppliers will 
have the resources to analyse the data that are published as part of the 
transparency agenda, and will be able to identify which services are 
underperforming or costing above average. This will also be in their financial 
interest, as suppliers will be keen to ‘cherry pick’ those services that are most 
likely to fail a challenge, and trigger procurement processes that could lead to 
them delivering the services through outsourcing arrangements.  
 
As such, these unaccountable private sector suppliers will be the only 
organisations with sufficient capacity and incentive to process the transparency 
data and come to a judgement about financial management and performance. 
Indeed, in the absence of the Audit Commission, they will probably become the 
de facto performance auditors of English local authorities. In addition, although 
the white paper promises that there will be a ‘level playing field’ to ensure that all 
bids are judged equally, it does not acknowledge that the teams on this field will 
vary hugely in terms of their available resources and capacity. Consequently, 
smaller third sector organisations would need to pull off “giant-killings” to win the 
bigger contracts, as large outsourcing companies are much more likely to be 
successful in any procurement process.  
 
Returning to Foucault (1977), transparency data will therefore only become 
‘visible’ once they have been processed and presented by the outsourcing 
companies that are looking to challenge an incumbent service provider. As such, 
this data analysis would effectively replace performance audits for most local 
authority services. This would mean that performance assessments are carried 
out by organisations that are not independent and have no responsibility to 
citizens or duty to provide services in the public interest – in contrast to existing 
public sector watchdogs. They would also be focused narrowly on services that 
are perceived to be either poor-performing or high-cost, and therefore vulnerable 
to outsourcing. Finally, as Funnell (2000) has identified, private sector suppliers 
are much more likely to withhold information on the grounds of commercial 
confidence, which could mean that the assessments are incomplete and/or 
misleading. Such a situation would have significant implications for the 
accountability of public services in general and of public auditing in particular. 
 
It also becomes clear that these developments would run counter to the notion 
that the monitoring of local public service bodies is shifting from a panoptical 
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towards a synoptical approach. If the transparency data only become visible after 
potential service providers have analysed and presented them, then we cannot 
say that public bodies are being held accountable through a democratic, 
transparent, synoptical process – because citizens do not have the means of 
surveillance at their disposal. Instead, it is much more likely that the panoptical 
framework will continue, but private sector firms will assume the role of watcher 
within the system. From the public body’s perspective, the threat of a challenge 
would be analogous to the risk of being observed in the Panopticon, and 
authorities are therefore likely to moderate their behaviour in response to 
potential private sector pressure, rather than citizens’ priorities. 
 
In addition to these concerns about democratic accountability, there is also a risk 
that a lack of independent oversight of public spending will result in 
mismanagement and potentially corruption. As Free and Radcliffe (2009) have 
shown, the implementation of NPM ideas in Canada meant that its approach to 
audit and accountability became fragmented and decentralised. The result was a 
major financial scandal – the ‘sponsorship scandal’ – which led to the Canadian 
Government resuscitating its Office of the Comptroller General and giving it 
significant powers to monitor public spending in order to prevent a reoccurrence. 
Whether the UK will follow a similar path remains to be seen. 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
 
As we have seen, prior to losing the 2010 general election, the UK’s Labour 
Government adopted a panoptical approach to the management of public bodies. 
This involved charging central watchdogs with the task of assessing the extent to 
which agencies and local authorities were achieving targets that had been set by 
ministers and civil servants. These watchdogs produced reports on how well 
authorities were managing their finances, improving corporate performance and 
delivering services. Inspectorates formed these judgments on the basis of the 
authorities’ financial and performance reports, site visits (which were sometimes 
unannounced) and interviews with key stakeholders both inside and outside the 
Council (Audit Commission, 2010). By the end of the 2000s, and at the behest of 
Labour ministers, the Audit Commission amalgamated the judgments of various 
inspectorates into a single assessment of the extent to which public bodies were 
improving outcomes at the local level. Several different watchdogs were involved 
in the assessment process, in most cases because existing bodies already had 
responsibility for monitoring specific local services. In spite of this, and the fact 
that audit bodies limited themselves primarily to operational issues outside the 
political arena, we can characterise this approach as being broadly panoptical 
because of its centralised nature and the fact that authorities could never be sure 
what the auditor might find. 
 
Since then, the new Coalition Government has dismantled most of this 
institutional architecture and has instead required public bodies to make a large 
amount of their financial and performance data available online. Assuming that 
these data are accurate and paint a genuine picture of how the organisation is 
functioning, this ‘transparency’ agenda fits much more closely with a synoptical 
model of surveillance – at least at the level of ministerial rhetoric. This is because 
(theoretically at least) citizens can access data that will enable them to hold 
public bodies to account directly through their role as ‘armchair auditors’, and 
therefore the ‘many’ are able to monitor the activities of the ‘few’. Government 
ministers have suggested that this democratisation of data will improve public 
accountability (Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010) 
because citizens would be better informed about standards of financial 
management and performance within their local authority. Following this line of 
argument, initiatives set in train by the Open Public Services white paper would 
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then give them the opportunity to access services from an alternative supplier or 
complain about service quality to the Ombudsman. As such, accountability is 
exercised by citizens, from the bottom-up. In addition, removing professional 
auditors from the process would render debates about their independence and 
perceived collusion in ‘public secrets’ immaterial, because citizens would be able 
to come to their own conclusions about whether public services provide value for 
money.  
 
However, it is very unlikely that this new model of surveillance and accountability 
will become a reality. Due to the nature and volume of data that will be 
published, and the fact that suppliers will have the “right to challenge” incumbent 
service providers, the Coalition’s reforms are much more likely to result in 
outsourcing firms (rather than private citizens) becoming the de facto 
performance auditors of local public sector bodies. This is because suppliers will 
be in the best position to make the relevant data visible and meaningful to the 
rest of the population, and it may also be in their financial interests to do so. As 
such, rather than heralding a new, democratic, ‘synoptical’ process that will 
enable individuals to monitor the performance of public services by analysing 
publicly-available data, these reform initiatives are more likely to result in 
outsourcing companies assuming the role of observer within an enduring 
panoptical system. Unlike their predecessors, these new watchdogs will not be 
accountable to the public through Parliament. This raises significant additional 
questions about the independence of public audit, and exacerbates concerns 
about the potential undesirable consequences of New Public Management 
principles.  
 
To contrast this situation with Radcliffe and Funnell’s debate about the role of 
public auditors, neither elected officials nor state-funded appointees will be 
responsible for assessing local authorities in England. Instead, private companies, 
who will have no responsibilities other than to their shareholders, will be the most 
powerful judges of local government performance. In response to Radcliffe, these 
suppliers will be less inclined to agree compromises and uphold ‘public secrets’ 
than professional auditors, as they will have a financial interest in exposing poor 
performance by incumbent suppliers. Yet Funnell’s defence of the auditor’s 
independence will also become less relevant, because these private companies 
will be acting in their own interests, rather than those of the public. Armed with 
data provided through the transparency agenda and Freedom of Information Acts, 
suppliers will be extremely well-placed to furnish elected officials, the media and 
wider public with their own interpretations of how well local public services are 
being delivered. Indeed, these suppliers will assume a dual role of both the 
‘watchdog’ and ‘attack dog’ for local authorities in England – and the most 
important ‘armchair auditors’ will probably be sitting in the boardroom rather 
than the lounge.  
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